The proposed system for an elected House of Lords lacks accountability and offers voters far less choice than had previously been envisaged by Johnston, Ron
blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/po liticsandpolicy/archives/24915
The proposed system for an elected House of Lords lacks
accountability and offers voters far less choice than had
previously been envisaged
Ron Johnston explains the draft legislation for an elected Upper Chamber and suggests
that parties will come to dominate, the inability to re-elect members leaves an accountability
gap, and much less choice is now offered to voters than had been advocated previously by
the Liberal Democrats.
In the draf t legislation f or an elected House of  Lords published in 2010 the Deputy Prime
Minister ’s proposals ref lected his party’s posit ion on electoral systems. Members would
be elected f rom relatively small constituencies – 6-7 members f rom each at every election (except f or
Northern Ireland and Wales) – using the Single Transf errable Vote (STV). As well as ensuring quasi-
proportional representation, this system would allow voters not only to express their pref erence f or the
various candidates f ielded by their pref erred party but also – if  they wished – to give high pref erences to
candidates f rom more than one party as well as f or those standing as independents. Voter choice would
be maximised in the selection of  individuals to conduct the legislative and executive f unctions that the
second chamber would continue to undertake.
This system has been abandoned in the proposals contained in the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012,
published on 27 June. Three tranches of  120 members are to be elected at each quinquennial election
(held on the same day as elections to the House of  Commons); they will serve f or f if teen years and then
be ineligible f or re-election. In the draf t proposals there were to be only 80 in each tranche, making a
smaller House of  300 rather than the revised number of  450 – 360 elected and 90 appointed.
The proposed elections are to be conducted in twelve, on average, much larger constituencies than
those originally proposed – the nine English regions plus one each f or Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales (those twelve are also the constituencies f or elections to the European Parliament) – with the
allocation of  seats as f ollows:
East Midlands                                9              South West                                  11
Eastern                                         11              West Midlands                            11
London                                        14              Yorkshire and the Humber          10
North East                                     5              Northern Ireland                            3
North West                                  14              Scotland                                       10
South East                                   16              Wales                                             6
The decision to move to larger constituencies was def ended by Lord Strathclyde in the House of  Lords
on 27 June – ‘to provide a clear dif f erentiation between the role of  MPs and that of  elected members of
the ref ormed House’. He concluded – rightly – than there would be ‘signif icant practical issues’ if  STV
was deployed f or such larger constituencies; the choice of  electoral system was determined by a
decision on constituency size (itself  a f unction of  MPs’ concerns that members of  the Upper House
would compete with them to serve local interests).
Within each region the electoral system to be used is – with one, not insignif icant, exception – the same
as that deployed f or elections to the European Parliament. Thus in Northern Ireland STV is to be used;
elsewhere a party list system. The dif f erence concerns the details of  the list system. A closed list system
is used f or elections to the European Parliament. The voter decides which party to support and has no
inf luence on which of  its candidates will be elected: if  a party is entit led to three seats in a region, then
the three highest-ranked candidates on its list are elected – the voters cannot inf luence that ordering.
The proposed system f or elections to the House of  Lords deploys open rather than closed lists. Each
party ranks its candidates in order of  pref erence f or being elected; thus, if  it  wins two seats the f irst two
candidates on that list will normally be successf ul. But if  the electors who support that party do not
approve of  its ordering of  candidates, they can indicate which one (but only one) of  the candidates on
its list they pref er. Thus, f or example, if  party X is entit led to one seat, this will go to the highest-ranking
candidate on its list, unless a substantial number of  the party’s supporters indicate that they pref er a
candidate placed lower on the list.
This electoral system – which guarantees outcomes close to proportional representation – is superior
to the closed list procedure deployed f or elections to the European Parliament (save in Northern Ireland).
But it is inf erior to that proposed in the draf t legislation because it of f ers electors minimal choice over
which candidates should represent them: they have to select one party only (or one person standing as
an independent), and can only indicate their pref erence f or one among their selected party’s candidates.
The proposed system has a number of  other def ects.
Like the system used f or election to the European Parliament, it uses the d’Hondt method to
allocate seats across the parties in each region af ter the votes have been counted. D’Hondt,
unlike the Sainte Laguë method widely used elsewhere f or both closed and open list elections,
f avours the larger over the smaller parties.
Because the proposed constituencies are very unequal in size – in England the smallest will
return less than one-third of  the members as the largest – the threshold f or winning a seat will
vary considerably across the country, again to the disadvantage of  the smaller parties and
independents in the smaller regions. In the North East region (with 5 seats), to win a single seat a
party will need to get at least 1/6th (i.e.17 per cent) of  the votes, whereas in the South East (with
16) it will need only 1/17th (6 per cent).
Although electors can indicate which of  their party’s candidates they pref er, the threshold that
has to be crossed in order f or such pref erences to be deployed is substantial, set out in the Bill as
5 per cent of  the total number of  votes that the party obtains.  That is a substantial number f or
most candidates unless either (a) they are very well-known publicly there or/and (b) they campaign
very hard in the region – or parts of  it – f or those personal votes.
The Liberal Democrats’ general posit ion on elections to collective bodies such as national legislatures is
that they should maximise voters’ choices: members of  the electorate should be able to indicate not only
their relative pref erence f or candidates f ielded by one (perhaps their pref erred) party but also their
pref erences f or candidates across the various parties, as well as independents. The STV system which
the Liberal Democrats have promoted f or many decades is best able to achieve this among the systems
generally considered, and it was in the coalit ion government’s init ial proposals f or a partly-elected House
of  Lords (under the name of  the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg).
That system has been dropped f rom the draf t legislation, in order to have larger constituencies in which
elected members of  the House of  Lords would not be tempted to compete with MPs as representatives
of  local interests – or even the concerns of  individual electors. Instead, they have proposed an electoral
system that of f ers the electorate two choices only – between the various parties (with each independent
candidate being the equivalent of  a party), and among the candidates of  their chosen party (and there
they can indicate their f irst choice only).
The result of  this switch – if  the proposals are implemented – will be elections dominated by the parties.
It is very likely that no party will have a majority among the elected members of  the new House (the 20
per cent of  appointed members will be non-partisan, although some may vote more of ten with one party
than another). One or more parties may then hold the balance of  power there. This may not be too
signif icant as the House’s roles are not to change – it will concentrate on legislative and executive
scrutiny, with legislative power remaining with the House of  Commons. But the nature, length and
outcome of  that scrutiny could change – with the new Upper House being less willing to concede to the
‘other House’ unless there is clear agreement (legislation?) regarding the resolution of  inter-House
dif f erences.
Much democratic theory holds that members of  elected legislatures should have both legit imacy and
accountability. Legitimacy is provided by success at an election; accountability by the voters’ ability to
evaluate the legislator ’s perf ormance at the next election. The latter is absent f rom the proposals since
members elected f or f if teen years will be ineligible f or re-election: voters can evaluate a party’s
perf ormance but not an individual member’s. Parties will dominate in the new House – and because of
the chosen electoral system voters will be largely denied the opportunity to determine who represents
them there, even within individual parties.
The Liberal Democrat party has long advocated an electoral system that of f ers much more choice than
the one that, af ter negotiations with their coalit ion partners, they now of f er. Only in the country’s
smallest region – Northern Ireland – will their pref erred system be deployed. For the majority of  UK
citizens who scrutinises legislation and holds the executive to account in the revised Upper Chamber will
be determined by their choice among the polit ical parties only.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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